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Many science education researchers have argued that learners’ commitment to a substance (matter-based) ontology 
impedes the learning of scientific concepts that scientists typically conceptualize as processes or interactions, such 
as such as force, electric current, and heat. By this account, students’ tendency to classify these entities as substances 
or properties of substances leads to robust misconceptions, and instruction should steer novices away from 
substance-based reasoning.  We argue that substance-based reasoning, when it supports learners’ sense-making, can 
form the seeds for sophisticated understanding of these very same physics concepts.  We present a case study of a 
group of elementary school science teachers in our professional development program. The teachers build a 
sophisticated explanation for why objects of different masses have the same acceleration due to gravity, starting 
from substance-based metaphors for gravity.  We argue that, for conceptual, epistemological, and affective reasons, 
instructional interventions should focus on tapping these productive matter-based resources rather than attempting to 
replace them. 
 
PACS: 01.40.-d, 01.40.J-, 01.40.gb 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
Research in physics and science 
education has documented the existence and 
persistence of naïve ideas held by learners in 
domains such as mechanics, 
thermodynamics, and electricity and 
magnetism  [1‒6]. Researchers generally 
agree that, in the process of learning correct 
science concepts, learners must articulate 
and in some cases rethink their naïve 
conceptions  [7,8]. Researchers often 
disagree, however, about when and how 
instructors should guide students during that 
process. These disagreements stem in part 
from different accounts of the cognitive 
structure of students’ naïve ideas  [9].   
For instance, some researchers 
attribute comparatively robust, stable 
“misconceptions” to students, 
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misconceptions that cannot contribute to a 
more expert understanding  [1,2,10].  By 
this account, teachers should help students 
confront their misconceptions early in the 
conceptual change process, so that students 
do not incorporate the misconception into 
the new knowledge structures they 
construct. By contrast, other researchers 
describe student’s naïve conceptions as 
consisting of loose collection of abstractions 
based on physical experiences in the world, 
such as closer is stronger and more effort 
produces more result, and incorrect ideas as 
resulting from the contextual activations of 
these knowledge fragments  [11‒14].  By 
this account, conceptual change consists 
largely of restructuring those intuitive ideas, 
and hence teachers should look for and help 
students build upon the seeds of productive 
thinking in students’ reasoning, even in their 
incorrect conceptions  [9,15].  
Other models of cognitive structures 
and conceptual change fall somewhere in 
between. Some such models assume that 
naïve knowledge and cognitive dynamics 
are strongly constrained by particular 
cognitive commitments  [16,17] but allow 
for variability in students’ ideas (and 
underlying cognitive dynamics) that do not 
violate those commitments. A prominent 
line of research within this category argues 
that novice commitments are ontological in 
nature, i.e., that students have robust 
preconceptions about the nature of the 
physical entities they encounter in science 
courses  [17‒22].  Specifically, according to 
this framework, novices incorrectly persist 
in conceiving of scientific processes (such 
as heat, force, and light) as substances; and 
these mis-ontologies lead to many of the 
specific, robust misconceptions documented 
in the literature. In keeping with this 
theoretical perspective, instructional reforms 
have been designed in introductory physics 
topics to steer students away from 
“incorrect” substance ontology and towards 
“correct” process ontology  [21,23] 
In this paper we challenge this char-
acterization of substance ontology as unpro-
ductive, arguing that “incorrect” ontological 
reasoning can be productive for the genera-
tion of sophisticated and correct scientific 
argument and reasoning. In the case of some 
concepts such as energy, our argument is not 
particularly striking; when done judiciously, 
thinking of energy as analogous to con-
served “stuff” can be useful in both novice 
and expert reasoning  [24–27]. Our argu-
ment is surprising because we apply it to 
force, a concept that experts are less likely 
to talk about in terms of substance-based 
analogies, perhaps in part because force is 
generally not a conserved quantity.  Despite 
the seeming unproductiveness of a sub-
stance ontology of force, we argue that 
thinking of gravity as “stuff-like” contribut-
ed to learners’ conceptual process in learn-
ing about gravity, forces, and motions, pro-
gress that would likely have been less trans-
formative for the participants had the in-
structors steered students away from this 
“mis-ontology.”    
We begin with a brief review of the 
literature on novice ontologies in physics in 
Section II. Section III then discusses the 
methodology of our data collection and 
analysis. Section IV presents our analysis of 
the data. We end with discussions and 
conclusions in Section V. 
II. SUMMARY OF RESEARCH ON 
NOVICE ONTOLOGIES IN PHYSICS 
In this section we review the re-
search on novices’ ontologies in physics and 
the instructional implications. First we pre-
sent the view that many novice misconcep-
tions in science stem from students’ mis-
ontologies, specifically their incorrect, un-
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productive classification of certain entities 
as substances. Then, we present research 
challenging this view. We end by discussing 
the limited research on novices’ ontologies 
of forces and the purported implications for 
instructors who encounter students using 
substance-based metaphors/descriptions for 
forces. 
A. Some researchers argue for suppress-
ing substance-based ontologies for science 
concepts 
In a prominent line of work, Chi and 
colleagues have proposed that novices’ 
ontology of science concepts such as force, 
electric current, and light are the primary 
barrier to their learning of these 
concepts  [17,18,20,28].  Here, a learner’s 
ontology of an entity refers to her sense of 
the basic nature of that entity.  For example, 
an entity such as table, could fit into many 
categories ‒ furniture, something made of 
wood or metal, something having four legs, 
an object in the dining room, etc. ‒ but at the 
broadest level most of us would consider a 
table to fit within the category of objects; in 
other words, object is the ontological 
category for table. The term ontology in 
philosophy is often used to refer to describe 
the nature of the world, the most basic 
categories in the world. In cognitive science 
and learning sciences the term has been used 
to refer to a psychological construct: the 
mental categories into which an individual 
divides the world  [29,30]. It is in this latter 
sense that we use the term in this paper. 
Chi and colleagues use this notion of 
ontology to help explain the expert-novice 
divide in science  [17,18,20,28]. In this 
view: (1) many notoriously difficult-to-learn 
science ideas such as electric current, forces, 
heat, and light belong to the ontological 
category of process; (2) experts categorize 
these science ideas correctly as “processes,” 
while (3) novices tend to misclassify these 
ideas as substances/matter; and additionally, 
(4) novices are committed to the incorrect 
categorization.  Thus, mis-categorization 
and resistance to re-categorization leads to 
robust misconceptions about these entities. 
In this view, the first step in successfully 
teaching these topics must involve 
interventions that help students replace their 
mistaken ontological categorization with the 
correct one. During and after this 
intervention, the instructor must carefully 
avoids any language, analogy, or metaphor 
that might cue or reinforce the incorrect 
ontological category.  
This view has been taken up by other 
researchers and has influenced theory-
building on conceptual change as well as 
instruction in secondary and college 
classrooms.  [23,31‒40].  For instance, 
Brookes and Etkina  [41‒43] have proposed 
that experts often use metaphorical language 
that encodes incorrect ontologies, for 
example using the metaphor of a physical 
well to describe a potential function in 
quantum mechanics.  Novices tend to 
unproductively adopt and extend the 
ontologies embedded in experts’ linguistic 
expressions, leading to incorrect responses 
or ideas which can become resistant to 
instruction  [41,43].  In earlier work, 
Brookes  [44] proposes that students often 
categorize science concepts when first 
introduced to them, and so, in order to avoid 
miscategorizations, an instructor should 
avoid any language and representations that 
encodes incorrect ontologies in its 
grammatical structure. In later work, 
however, Brookes and Etkina  [42] have 
moved away from this recommendation (see 
the next sub-section).  
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B. Some recent work argues that sub-
stance ontology can be productive for 
learning physics 
Other researchers have argued 
against the idea that substance/matter based 
ontologies are un-productive. We discuss 
these arguments in brief and connect them to 
the particular argument we are making in 
this paper. 
diSessa  has argued that expert 
understanding of many non-matter concepts 
such as energy and momentum involves 
matter-based cognitive elements such as 
resources for understanding conservation.  
Gupta, Hammer, and Redish  [45,46] 
argue that both experts and novices flexibly 
shift in their ontological stances toward 
physics concepts such as light, electric 
current, and heat. They present a case study 
of a classroom discussion. In one segment of 
the discussion, a student, Kimberly, talks 
about electric current as a substance moving 
in the wires. Later in the discussion, she 
shifts to talking about current as a process in 
which electrons move in the wires. 
Kimberly’s conceptualization of matter-like 
entity (what she called “current”) moving 
through the wires was productive in her 
generating a correct understanding of 
Kirchhoff’s junction rule in parallel circuits. 
Thus, Gupta et al.  [45] argue that 
substance-based ideas are not a barrier to 
generating correct understanding. 
Within physics education, 
researchers are increasingly attending to the 
ontologies of specific science concepts, their 
use by novices, and the instructional 
affordances and constraints of particular 
ontological descriptions  [24,25,27,47‒56]. 
Swackhamer  [24], Brewe  [25] and 
Scherr  [26,27] have argued for the 
instructional productivity of a substance 
ontology of energy, conceptualizing energy 
in terms of everyday ideas used for material 
objects such as location, storage, 
conservation, and movement, but without 
necessarily burdening it with every single 
attribute of a material object (such as having 
weight or color). Brewe  [25] shows how 
students can productively use the energy-as-
a-substance metaphor for problem solving in 
physics. Brookes and Etkina  [41,42] have 
argued that experts often use ontological 
metaphors, e.g., productively using matter-
based ideas for non-matter entities. 
Expressions such as “particle in a well,” 
“tunneling,” and “potential well” draw on 
matter-based conceptions for non-matter 
concepts such as the potential due to an 
electric charge and the quantum motion of a 
particle in that potential. They have argued 
that language use that is often diagnosed as 
reflecting a misconception might actually be 
a symptom of students’ struggling to 
understand the ontology of a science concept 
and that the appropriate instructional 
response is to attend closely to students’ use 
of ontological metaphors to help students 
make sense of the ideas: “physicists’ 
language indicates that they categorize the 
concept of ‘force’ into different ontological 
categories, depending on context. In the case 
of ontological disambiguation, we, the 
teachers, may simply be failing to hear the 
questions our students are asking. Namely, 
students need help sorting out the different 
ways in which the concept of force is 
categorized ontologically rather than help 
being disabused of certain mistaken ideas 
they might have.”  ( [42], p. 010110-11). 
Baily and Finkelstein  [47] explore whether 
and how students draw on quantum versus 
classical ideas (and associated wave versus 
particle ontologies) to explain phenomenon 
such as electron diffraction and interference.  
Having briefly reviewed the debate 
about the productivity and unproductivity of 
novices’ use of substance ontology, we now 
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turn to some research on the ontologies 
underlying novices’ conceptions of forces. 
C. Research on novices’ ontologies of 
physical forces 
Research on novices’ conceptions of 
basic mechanics is extensive  [3,4,6,57,58]. 
Much of this work does not directly refer to 
novices’ ontology of force concept; but some 
of the research can be and has been re-
conceptualized in terms of ontology. For 
example, Brown  [59] claimed that students’ 
incorrect responses on Newton’s third law 
questions arise because they conceptualize 
force as the property of an object. Reiner et 
al.  [19] draw from a variety of research on 
students’ understanding of mechanics to 
argue that novices think about physical 
forces in terms of a material substances 
schema: “Thus, force can be seen as a 
process of interaction between two objects 
… All these concepts are misconceived by 
novices as material substances or at least as 
possessing attributes of material substances.” 
( [19], p. 11). Reiner et al.  [19] argue that 
documented novice misconceptions in 
mechanics such as associating a higher force 
with a faster object, conceptualizing gravity 
as the potential for all objects to fall, or the 
notions that force can be transferred from 
one object to another and can dissipate 
reflect a substance ontology of forces. 
Drawing on an historical analysis by 
Jammer  [60], Brookes and Etkina  [42] 
classify the historical use of the term force 
by scientists as one of four ontological 
metaphors: as an agent, as an internal drive 
or desire, as a passive medium of 
interaction, or as the property of an object. 
They argue that students often view forces 
as a property of motion, rather than of an 
object; and that their difficulties likely stem 
from trying to disentangle the different 
ontological metaphors available for talking 
about forces: an act of “ontological 
disambiguation.” 
Mostly, researchers have regarded 
students’ use of forces as a property of 
objects as problematic. Researchers who 
argue for the productivity of substance-
based ontological metaphors/reasoning 
about non-material entities have discussed 
entities such as energy, momentum, and 
fields, but not forces. (One exception to may 
be Brookes and Etkina  [42], who note that 
expert physicists use language that could 
reflect forces having agency, for example. 
While they do not explicitly take a stance on 
the productivity of a substance ontology for 
forces, their observation that expert 
physicists use such language could suggest 
that they do not consider such use to be 
unproductive in the case of novices).  
In light of the unsettled debate on the 
appropriate instructional response to 
learners’ use of incorrect ontologies, what 
might be a proper instructional response 
when novices draw on substance ideas for 
forces?  In this paper, we contribute to this 
debate on instructional strategies by 
analyzing a group of elementary- and 
middle- school teachers (physics novices) 
trying to figure out why heavier and lighter 
objects fall at the same rate when air 
resistance is negligible. At key moments, 
their language and reasoning reflects an 
underlying ontology of gravity as a material 
agent/substance. Our analysis bolsters the 
argument that at least in some instances 
substance-based metaphors for non-material 
entities̶even forces̶can be productive for 
physics learners. Therefore, instruction 
should not necessarily aim to immediately 
push students away from using such 
ontological “miscategorizations.”  Indeed, 
interventions that prematurely curb either 
linguistic or conceptual use of incorrect 
ontologies might be detrimental to learners’ 
progress. 
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III. DATA COLLECTION AND 
METHODS OF ANALYSIS  
A. Setting 
Our analysis focuses on a discussion 
on falling objects by middle and elementary 
school science teachers in a two-week 
summer professional development workshop 
in 2009. The workshop aimed to engage the 
teachers in scientific inquiry and to assist 
them in developing resources for facilitating 
inquiry-based science instruction in their 
own classrooms. 18 teachers participated, 
facilitated by 6 researchers (including the 
three co-authors). During the first week, 
teachers engaged for three hours per day in 
an extended inquiry on the motion of falling 
objects. The discussions were largely driven 
by the ideas and explanations generated by 
the teacher participants. They cycled 
through small groups discussions (groups of 
4-5) and whole-group discussions. The lead 
facilitator coordinated the transitions 
between small and large group discussions. 
Small-group discussions allowed 
participants to generate or refine ideas in a 
setting that afforded greater focus and a 
safer space for the quieter participants to 
contribute. Typically, one of the facilitators 
would listen in on a small-group discussion, 
moderating as needed.  Whole-group 
discussions served to share and/or contrast 
ideas and explanations, to make progress 
toward consensus, evaluate emerging 
evidence, or decide on next steps. All small- 
and large-group discussions were 
videotaped. 
B. Data Selection 
At the end of each workshop day, the 
facilitators debriefed to share their 
impressions of the inquiry session and note 
particular moments in small-group and 
large-group discussions that might 
contribute to the project’s research 
questions, which included how teachers 
come to participate in authentic scientific 
inquiry.  
At the end of the workshop, the 
researchers compiled a list of notable 
moments from the workshop, which were 
then transcribed.  These transcribed video-
records were then analyzed in video analysis 
meetings in which the entire research team 
participated. The transcript in this paper 
follows the typical conventions in physics 
education research literature. The only 
things to note are: (i) ellipses (…) denote a 
pause in the speech, (ii) words surrounded 
by slashes (/) represent our best attempt at 
capturing utterances that were difficult to 
hear, and (iii) italicized phrases in regular 
parenthesis () indicate gestures or other non-
verbal information. Punctuation in the 
transcription relies on the prosody (pitch, 
rhythm, intonation) and on the conventional 
interpretation of the utterance.  
In this paper, we present two related 
episodes in which the participants discuss 
why objects of different masses fall with the 
same acceleration. The first episode is a 
small-group discussion. The second episode 
comes from the ensuing whole-group 
discussion moderated by Elby.  
We selected these episodes for the 
following reasons: 
1. Episode 1 (Small Group): The 
teachers in the selected group 
authentically struggled to explain 
why objects of different weights “fall 
at the same rate,” a result they knew 
from before. In doing so, the teachers 
described gravity using multiple 
analogies and metaphors that 
provided rich insight into the 
ontologies that the teachers attributed 
to the concept of gravity. In our 
initial viewing of the videotape, we 
noticed that some of their language 
and analogies for gravity seemed to 
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reflect a substance-based ontology. 
Since we knew that these teachers 
had come up with interesting 
conceptual ideas, we decided to 
explore whether and how their use of 
substance-based language and 
analogies affected their conceptual 
progress in answering this question. 
2. Episode 2 (Whole Group): In this 
episode, the teachers from the small 
group share their ideas with the 
whole group. We selected this 
episode because (i) in our 
preliminary viewing we saw 
evidence of ontological variability , 
(ii) we were struck by the “coolness” 
of the reasoning Lynn articulated for 
the whole group, and (iii) we wanted 
to analyze and showcase how they 
made progress toward constructing a 
correct understanding of why objects 
of different weights have the same 
acceleration when falling. 
As shown below, it turned out that 
some of the ontologies the teachers 
attributed to gravity were “incorrect.” Given 
the debate in the literature on whether 
incorrect ontological reasoning should be 
quickly challenged by the instructor  [46,61] 
in order for correct conceptions to develop, 
the selected episodes had the potential to 
inform this debate.  
C. Analysis 
Through a close analysis of the tran-
script of the small- and whole-group discus-
sions, we characterize the ontology of gravi-
ty implied by the verbal utterances of the 
speakers.  We rely primarily on two methods 
for inferring the ontological commitments in 
speech—predicate analysis  [20] and analy-
sis of grammatical metaphors  [42]—each of 
which will be discussed in more detail be-
low. At times, our participants made explicit 
analogies to represent gravity.  We will also 
characterize the ontological commitments 
implied by these analogies.  Although predi-
cate analysis and grammatical analysis are 
distinct approaches, for our purposes we 
take them to be largely complementary.   
Both methods analyze lexical units to infer 
the implicit ontological commitments of 
speakers, and both draw similar distinctions 
between the ontological categories (e.g., ma-
terial substances vs. processes).  Although 
these approaches differ in the details of how 
they go about coding statements for these 
categories, both methods should by and 
large agree on the code for any given state-
ment.  In what follows, we will describe 
how each coding scheme works, and how 
we combine them.  
1. Method of Predicate Analysis 
Predicate analysis, originally 
developed by Sommers  [62], has been used 
for classifying the implicit ontological 
commitments in language  [29].  The 
method is based on the observation that in 
natural language, a given target entity (e.g., 
the tree) cannot be paired with just any 
predicate (e.g., is an hour long).  When a 
predication is not allowable, it signals that 
the ontological category of the entity (e.g., 
an object) is not compatible that of its 
predicate (e.g., a process).  When the 
predication is allowable, the ontological 
category of the predicate can be used to infer 
the ontological category of the target entity. 
Keil  [29] applied this method to the 
language used by children and adults in or-
der to study the interrelated psychological 
development of ontology, language, and 
conceptual understanding.  Chi and her col-
leagues further adapted this method to ex-
plore students’ ontologies of science con-
cepts  [17,18,20–22,28]. They draw ontolog-
ical distinctions between three fundamental 
categories: substance/matter, process, and 
mental states. They argue that science con-
cepts such as heat, light, force, etc. correctly 
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belong to the category process, and that nov-
ices tend to incorrectly categorize them, say, 
as matter.   
To evaluate students’ ontologies of 
science concepts, Chi, Slotta and 
colleagues  [17,20,28] have developed 
taxonomies of various predicates for both 
the matter and process categories, which 
they use to code transcripts of students’ 
speech.  For example, matter (but not 
processes) can move and can consume (or be 
consumed), and so move and consume are 
classified as substance/matter predicates that 
are often exemplified in speech.  Consider 
the following hypothetical student’s 
reasoning for how a light bulb lights when 
connected to a battery: “The current comes 
out of the battery, travels down the wire, and 
is used up in the bulb.”  Predicate analysis 
would code for the following predicates 
applied to electric current: “comes out,” 
“travels down,” and “is used up.”  Within 
Chi’s framework, these predicates belong to 
the matter/substance category and this 
implies that the student has a 
matter/substance ontology of electric 
current  [17,20].  
2. Analysis of Grammatical Metaphors  
Like Chi, Slotta, & colleagues, 
Brookes and Etkina  [42] use a close exami-
nation of language-in-use to infer students’ 
ontology of physics concepts.  In particular, 
Brookes and Etkina focus their analysis on 
students’ ontology of force.  Instead of pred-
icates, their method focuses on the speaker’s 
use of grammatical metaphors, in which a 
term grammatically functions in ways that 
may differ from its literal meaning.  For ex-
ample, physicists would generally agree that 
forces are interactions, not objects.  And yet, 
physicists often speak of forces in ways that 
have them grammatically functioning as one 
of the objects participating in an interaction 
(e.g., “a force acts on the cart”), rather than 
being the interaction in their own right.    
This method focuses on grammatical 
structures to infer ontological substance of 
talk, with noun participants implying a 
matter/substance ontology and verbs 
indicating processes.  Drawing on a 
historical analysis of the concept of force in 
physics, they draw further distinctions 
between several substance-based metaphors 
that differ with respect to the role the noun 
participant is playing (active/passive) and its 
location (internal/external).  In the phrase “a 
force acts on the cart”, force is a noun 
participant that is playing an active role (the 
force is doing something to another object), 
and by acting on the cart it is implied to be 
located external to the cart.  This 
corresponds to the force as agent metaphor.  
The other substance-based grammatical 
metaphors are force as internal desire 
(location: internal; role: active), force as 
passive medium of interaction (location: 
external; role: passive), and force as a 
property of an object (location: internal; 
role: passive). 
3. Combining Methods 
For our purposes, the methods of 
predicate analysis and grammatical 
metaphors are generally complementary.  
When they overlap in application to our 
data, they generally agree.  However, they 
do not always both straightforwardly apply 
to any given statement.  For an example 
from our data, when a teacher says, 
“gravity’s still pulling the heavier object 
down,” gravity is playing the role of a noun 
participant, and so it is clear that Brookes 
and Etkina would code this as a 
substance/matter ontological metaphor̶
specifically, gravity as agent metaphor since 
gravity is playing an active role (pulling the 
object) and the phrase suggests it is located 
external to the object.  It is not so 
straightforward to determine how Chi and 
colleagues would code this however, since  
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“pulling” is not one of the predicates listed in 
their taxonomy of substance/matter 
predicates.  This is probably just because 
their taxonomies were developed to handle 
students’ ontologies of heat, light, and 
current, rather than force specifically, even 
though they fully expect their methods to 
handle the case of force as well  [19].  We 
could guess they would code this teacher’s 
ontology of force as substance, since 
“pulling” seems to predicate a substantive 
“puller.”  However, rather than guess how to 
extend the methods and taxonomies to deal 
with all of the predicates in our data, we will 
take a more conservative approach by 
relying more heavily on whichever of the 
two complementary methods gives a clearer 
signal in the case of any given utterance.   
And while we draw on the predicate 
analysis and grammatical analysis methods, 
we do not completely subscribe to the 
theoretical assumptions underlying these 
methods.  For example, we disagree with the 
presumption that novices’  (and experts’) 
language use generally implies they have 
stable, inflexible ontological commitments, 
an assumption underlying the predicate 
analysis method (for further discussion 
see  [45,46,61]).  At the same time, we agree 
that, at times, predicates, analogies, and 
linguistic structures in an utterance could 
reflect the speaker’s in-the-moment 
ontology. Given these caveats, we show our 
close analysis of utterances to illustrate how 
we are drawing evidence for our claims; and 
we present the transcript in full, so readers 
can draw their own conclusions and 
challenge ours. At opportune points in our 
analysis, we also discuss some of the 
nuanced differences between our theoretical 
and methodological inclinations and those of 
predicate analysis or grammatical analysis. 
We hope that this will give the readers a 
more situated understanding of these 
differences than would result from a 
decontextualized “philosophical” discussion. 
In the next section we start with our 
close analysis of the two targeted episodes, 
attending to the grammatical role of the 
terms “gravity” and “force,” the predicates 
attributed to those terms, and the use of 
grammatical metaphors and analogies.  
IV. EPISODE 1: TWO INCORRECT 
ONTOLOGICAL METAPHORS FOR 
GRAVITY 
In this section, we make the case that 
teachers in a small-group discussion drew on 
substance-based ontologies for understand-
ing gravity, and that doing so was produc-
tive for them.  We start by briefly recounting 
the events leading up to the small-group dis-
cussion.  
A. The lead up to Episode 1 
The workshop started with the 
following question:  
 
Suppose you are walking at a steady, 
fast pace in a straight path with your 
keys in an outstretched hand. If you 
wanted to drop (not throw) your keys 
into a trash can located ahead of 
you, should you drop the keys a little 
before you reach the trash can, right 
on top of it, or a little after you pass 
the trash can? 
 
Initially, there was no consensus. 
Some teachers said the keys would fall 
straight down due to the gravitational pull 
and so the keys should be dropped right 
above the trash can. Others said the keys 
should be dropped before reaching the can 
since they would keep moving forward after 
being dropped. A few said the keys should 
be dropped after passing the trash can, 
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emphasizing how something dropped from a 
moving vehicle seems to go backward due 
to the wind or how a handkerchief held out 
the window of a moving car streams 
backward, suggesting that it would move 
back if released. The teachers went on to do 
some trials of dropping keys as they walked 
in the corridor, and quickly came to 
consensus that when walking the keys would 
have to be dropped a little before passing the 
trash can. But this consensus led to further 
questions: What if they were running, or 
riding in a fast car? What if instead of keys 
you had a heavy object like a brick or anvil? 
What if you had a very light object like a 
feather? What if there was no gravity, as in 
outer space? What if there was no wind 
resistance, as on the moon?  
By the second day, the starting 
question about keys dropping into the trash 
can had become a means to explore 
conceptions about the motion of falling 
objects, and trying to unpack the effects as 
well as mechanisms by which gravity and 
air resistance influence the motion of falling 
objects. The activities cycled among 
debating ideas, designing experiments to test 
some of the ideas, and carrying out those 
experiments̶such as dropping a bottle 
filled with pennies and an empty bottle out 
of a moving car. The discussions and 
experiments focused teachers’ attention on 
the trajectory of the falling object, how fast 
an object was dropping, how much time it 
took to land, and whether the time to land 
depended on the weight of the object and the 
speed of the car.  
B. Episode 1: The small group discussion 
Within this unfolding discussion, our 
focal episode comes from day 5.  The 
teachers were struggling with the 
observation that the bottle filled with 
pennies hit the ground at the same time as a 
lighter bottle filled with water. This 
reminded some teachers of the standard 
demonstration many had seen or taught, that 
a heavy and light object dropped from the 
same height land at the same time.  Andy 
(Elby, second author) asks the teachers to 
discuss this issue in their small groups:  
 
Andy: Um, so, talk, there's one proposal 
that how gravity works on 
something doesn't care about its 
weight, so talk about this in your 
small groups. We know a heavy 
and light object just dropped here 
on earth, without significant air 
resistance, they fall together.  
Why? What's the causal story for 
why? 
 
We focus specifically on the 
discussion that ensues in the group of Lynn, 
Mira, Daniel, and Lisa. Lynn starts by 
recalling the experiment supposedly done by 
Galileo by dropping objects of differing 
mass from the Tower of Pisa: 
 
Mira: What is that (inaudible) 
Lynn: No matter what you drop, they fall 
the same...  
Mira: So what, the paper just had the... 
Lynn: air resistance, yeah if you discount 
air resistance, things, and there 
was that famous experiment they 
did off the Leaning Tower of Pisa 
or whatever, and they dropped the 
objects, or [XYZ] school where 
she drops the computer and 
the…and they all fall at the same 
time...Even though I know that it's 
going to fall at the same time, I 
feel that deep down in my heart, 
gravity's still pulling the heavier 
thing down…And I feel like it gets 
confusing with the whole idea of 
(something inaudible about going 
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forward, with a forward hand 
motion) when you throw 
something with more force, you 
know, it goes farther, two objects 
regardless of weight, the one I 
threw with more force would go 
farther, but I think I'm having a 
hard time disassociating the idea 
that those things that we see from 
just pure effects of 
gravity…because /even when/ we 
add force and we add air 
resistance...I don't know what 
causes gravity... 
 
Lynn’s statement indicates that she 
knows that the dropped objects of different 
masses fall the same distance in the same 
time but what is striking is her 
metacognitive reflection about how she feels 
about that answer.  “Deep down” she feels 
that her intuition is at odds with the answer.  
Her intuition is that gravity would pull 
harder on the heavier object. She relates this 
to her everyday intuition that more force 
would imply a greater distance for the same 
thrown object. In what follows, resolving 
this tension becomes the focus for this 
group. Lynn takes her intuition very 
seriously in spite of knowing the right 
answer and seems troubled at the 
inconsistency between the two.  As shown 
below, this tendency to seek coherence 
between multiple ideas is shared by the 
other members in her small group and is a 
key epistemological resource that enables 
them to make significant progress towards 
resolving this tension. 
Taken literally, Lynn’s statement, 
“gravity’s still pulling the heavier thing 
down” suggests that she is treating gravity as 
an agent capable of action (“pulling”).  
Grammatically, in this phrase, gravity is 
playing the role of an active noun 
participant that is external to the other 
interacting object (“heavier thing”), 
reflecting an agent metaphor within the 
substance/matter ontology  [42]. For force, 
the phrase “throw something with more 
force” suggests “force” as an entity that 
accompanies either the object being thrown 
or the action (the throw), depending on 
whether we interpret “with more force” as an 
adjectival or an adverbial phrase. 
Grammatically, “force” in this utterance 
takes on the role of a noun participant in a 
passive role. But it is not clear whether it is 
simply exerted on “something” or whether it 
becomes a property of it. So, from a 
metaphorical analysis, the utterance could 
suggest one of two metaphors; it could 
suggest a “force as passive medium of 
interaction” metaphor or a “force as a 
property of object” but it is not 
unequivocally clear which one it is. Either 
way, this statement would be coded as 
reflecting a substance-based ontology of 
force. 
Brief Reflection: To be clear:  in this 
analysis, we are not taking a stance about 
whether Lynn’s use of language reflects 
some stable psychological reality for her 
(e.g., she really thinks of forces and gravity 
as matter-like) or whether she is drawing on 
everyday language about force  [64] that has 
such metaphors and metonymies woven in 
its fabric, often invisible to the user 
entrenched in that language  [63].  Our point 
is simply that Lynn is using language that 
draws on properties typically attributed to 
objects/matter to describe her ideas about 
gravity and force. 
Given that Lynn’s language 
incorporates ideas that are not strictly 
“correct,” what is the correct instructional 
move for a facilitator in this instance? 
Should the use of language that incorporates 
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incorrect ontologies be allowed to continue 
or be nipped in the bud?  Some researchers 
have suggested that allowing the use of 
incorrect ontologies (and language that 
incorporates or supports incorrect 
ontologies) can severely impede the 
development of correct understanding of 
concepts  [18,20,21,44,61] and that such 
incorrect ontological utterances should be 
weeded out of the conversation at the 
earliest. In this paper we argue against this 
position, showing how incorrect ideas can 
contain the seeds of productive discussions 
and correct understandings.  In the case of 
Lynn and her group, the incorrect and 
conflicting ontological metaphors for gravity 
become the source for generation of a 
sophisticated argument for why objects of 
different masses fall with the same 
acceleration.  End of Reflection. 
After Lynn’s statement, Lisa tries to 
argue that gravity would adjust for the 
weight of the objects, but cannot articulate a 
mechanism.  And Lynn struggles with trying 
to think about a heavier object as made up of 
many little objects:  
 
Lisa: What was the question? 
Lynn: How can we explain the fact that 
two things fall at the same rate, 
even though [their weight]? 
Daniel: I mean... 
Lisa: Because if gravity (inaudible word) 
it will accommodate for the 
weight... like no matter what it is, 
it will... in my mind it's like 
Lynn: Here's a nickel .... (drawing 
separate quarters)  if you think of a 
quarter as having the same weight 
as 5 nickels, so if you, if gravity 
has whatever pull it has, it pulls 
that down (pointing to drawing on 
paper) And then basically, a larger 
object, just has the same pull as 
each of those /parts of/ ...so that… 
Here's a whole tootsie roll, it's 
divided into parts, it's the same 
per mass, it's the same /holes/, so 
the same  /equal/, so... 
 
This idea of conceptualizing a more 
massive object as a collection of lighter 
objects ("a quarter as having the same 
weight as 5 nickels”) later became a central 
idea within their group, driving the 
discussion.  Here, it is not entirely clear 
what Lynn means by “gravity has whatever 
pull it has.” But, grammatical analysis again 
places gravity in the role of a noun 
participant (a matter ontology). Also note 
how “pull” in this sentence also takes on the 
role of a noun participant (linguistically 
serving as a property of gravity). Gravity 
acts as an active agent in the utterance “it 
pulls that down,” taking “it” to refer to 
gravity.  
Daniel takes Lynn’s statement to 
mean that gravity would pull equally on the 
light and heavy object and questions that 
reasoning: 
 
Daniel:  But when they're connected, 
why wouldn't you have /more 
pull/ 
Lynn: well, because there's no...this part 
takes up this part of gravity, this 
part takes up, so it's like it works 
on mass, so that on one gram, it 
has a certain pull, but it just works 
on that gram, so if you add 
another gram to it, you don't 
double the pull of gravity on it, 
but it now has two grams to pull 
down. 
Daniel: I think that's as good as anything 
we'll come up with, but the 
question I want to ask is why don't 
you add these together?  
Gupta,	  Elby,	  Conlin:	  Substance	  Based	  Ontologies	  can	  be	  Productive	  May	  5,	  2013	  
 
Lynn: Because you still have the same 
amount of gravity, you add mass, 
so it only has, it still needs that 
(inaudible word). Let's say it takes 
one gallon to move a 500 pound 
car, then it's going to take two 
gallons of gasoline to move a 
1,000 pound car, so if you think of 
gravity as a force like that... even 
though there's more of something, 
that more of something has to 
have gravity working on it as well, 
kind of like gravity is a force. 
 
Lynn’s argument here conceives of a 
heavy object as made up of parts, each of 
which is lighter than the combined object; 
there is a certain gravitational pull on each 
part; and, when you add two light parts 
together gravity is not doubled.  By thinking 
of a larger object as made up of smaller 
identical pieces and each piece as having a 
fixed pull associated with it, and mapping 
gravity onto the pull on the smaller piece 
and not onto the total weight of the object, it 
seems Lynn is trying to accommodate both 
(i) the answer she knows to be correct (that 
the objects “fall together”) and (ii) her 
intuition that the object with larger mass 
feels heavier (i.e., pulled down with a 
greater force).  Lynn’s explanation here, 
though more elaborate than before, is still 
not reconciled with Daniel's argument for 
adding up the gravitational force on each 
part when putting multiple parts together.  
Note that in trying to reconcile her 
conflicting ideas, and addressing Daniel’s 
concerns, Lynn has effectively mapped 
gravity onto the force per unit mass, which 
would be the correct definition for 
gravitational field (i.e., the acceleration due 
to gravity). 
Here, Lynn’s analogy in which 
gravity is mapped onto the amount of fuel in 
a car suggests an ontology of gravity as 
matter/substance. “Takes up,” “part of” and 
“amount of” are all matter/substance 
predicates.  The phrase “works on” suggests 
the attribution of agency to gravity. For 
Daniel, Lynn’s insistence that the larger 
object has the same gravity as the smaller 
parts violates his intuition that they should 
“add” (a matter predicate) the gravity of the 
parts to get the gravity of the whole. The 
predicates “more” and “add” are matter-
based. Grammatically, in all of the 
utterances, gravity plays the role of a noun 
participant, suggesting a matter-based 
ontology. 
Brief Reflection: Part of the 
disagreement between Lynn and Daniel 
might stem from ambiguous use of 
pronouns. When Daniel poses the question, 
“why wouldn’t you have more pull?” it is not 
clear what the “more pull” acts on. Daniel 
could have been thinking about the 
gravitational pull on the connected object as 
a whole.  Lynn’s response, on the other 
hand, suggests that she might be opposing 
the idea that each component part of a larger 
object will not experience greater 
gravitational pull: “if you add another gram 
to [the first gram], you don't double the pull 
of gravity on [the first gram]” While the 
extensive use of pronouns might have 
contributed to the lack of clarity, we see the 
ensuing argument as productive for the 
participants. Daniel’s insistence at 
reconciling Lynn’s idea of equal gravity with 
the argument that a larger object should 
have more pull pushes Lynn to articulate her 
idea better. This kind of argumentation is 
crucial to creating knowledge and is an 
authentic science practice  [7,8].  The 
workshop facilitators, therefore, faced a 
tension between supporting this 
argumentation by letting it continue versus 
nudging the participants toward a correct 
ontology of gravity and force. In this 
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instance, the facilitators let the conversation 
continue without interjection.  End of 
Reflection. 
Daniel continues to argue against the 
idea that we can add objects without adding 
up the force of gravity on them ‒ partly to 
get a clear sense of Lynn’s reasoning and 
partly to problematize it.  Following Lynn’s 
analogy of fuel in a car, Daniel also tries to 
quantify gravity, now through the example 
of dividing an object into two lighter parts:  
 
Daniel: So wait a minute, you've got X 
gravity to pull this down (holds up 
whiteboard eraser) If you divide 
this in two, then the thing's likely 
to take one half X to pull this 
down, and one half X to pull that 
down (pointing to each half of the 
eraser) 
Lynn: No, no, because now it is 
(inaudible word)… Say there's a 
force of gravity here. I can't come 
over and borrow that force.  The 
pull here, where this is sitting, 
there's a constant amount of 
gravity in this section of it, it's 
going to pull this down, but for 
this part to come down, it needs to 
use this gravity over here.  It's all 
along the earth, so each little 
section has its own little gravity  
Mira: Like a force field! 
Daniel: Okay, but I think that my 
question's not answered yet.  This 
is a pound brick and it takes X 
amount of gravity to pull it down, 
you're saying there's still going to 
be X gravity pulling it down here 
(pointing to one half) and X gravity 
pulling it down here (pointing to 
other half), I want to know how it 
wouldn't be one half X and one 
half X. 
Lynn: Well, think of it this way. If I cut 
this in half, and put one half over 
here and one half over here 
(holding them apart), they're still 
going to come down at the same 
rate, right?  
Daniel: Mmm Hmm. 
Lynn: So, just the fact that they're joined 
together doesn't mean that it's 
going to take up more gravity.  If I 
cut this into little tiny pieces, 
each, you would argue that, like if 
we took that penny bottle, and we 
had all of the separate pennies 
lined up, they would still all come 
down at the same rate, but what 
you're arguing is the fact that 
we're putting them all together 
means they need less gravity to 
come down, and I guess what I'm 
arguing is that each mass, each 
little mass needs its part of gravity 
that pulls down, so the fact that 
you've added a bunch together 
doesn't mean that they're going to 
come down quicker.  Each little 
section still needs the same pull of 
gravity to pull it down. 
 
Here Daniel’s counter-arguments 
make explicit his assumption of conserving 
gravity: the total pull on an object should be 
the sum of the pull on the parts.  
In response to Daniel’s objection, 
Lynn further fleshes out an argument for 
why we cannot add or divide the gravity 
when we think of adding two objects to 
make a heavier one or dividing an object 
into lighter parts.  Here, she reasons that 
each part “use[s] the gravity” at its own 
location.  Here, Lynn is conceptualizing 
gravity as a constant pull spatially 
distributed, so that each part (of a larger 
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object) only experiences the pull at its own 
location.  The falling of a heavier object, in 
Lynn’s reasoning, is just as if a bunch of 
lighter objects were falling under the 
influence of gravity; each (lighter) part falls 
the same irrespective of whether it is a 
separate object or part of a heavier object.  
So, the bottle of pennies falls alongside a 
single penny, because each penny-in-the-
bottle is falling alongside the single penny.  
We should note that Lynn’s 
reasoning, of mapping gravity to the pull per 
mass-unit but rejecting that the gravity on 
the pieces can be added, provides a way to 
make sense of the phenomenon, but does not 
directly address why the more massive 
object feels heavier but has the same 
acceleration as a less massive object. 
Ontologically, Lynn and Daniel 
continue to reason about gravity as being 
quantifiable, having spatial location, and 
having agency (the ability to pull an object).  
A predicate analysis of Lynn’s and Daniel’s 
reasoning reveals multiple categories of 
substance attributes: less, more, and amount 
of as markers of the quantity predicate; use 
and takes as markers of the consume 
predicate; and borrow as a marker of the 
absorb predicate. The phrase “over here” 
attributes a location to gravity, which is part 
of the substance schema from Reiner et 
al.  [19]. Daniel’s utterance “X gravity 
pulling it down,” reflects the metaphor of 
gravity as an agent.  But Lynn’s developing 
argument has further nuance: it potentially 
rejects a “pure” substance ontology of 
gravity by rejecting the idea of 
adding/dividing gravity, i.e., by rejecting an 
aspect of conservation.  Daniel’s arguments, 
on the other hand, include the idea of gravity 
as a conserved quantity that is added up to a 
larger whole or divided into smaller bits 
depending on how the object is integrated or 
divided. 
Lynn’s reasoning fails to convince 
Daniel. And Lisa tries to compare Lynn’s 
idea of thinking about the gravity associated 
with each part of a heavier object with 
Lynn’s earlier analogy to fuel in a car.  Lynn 
tries to tie these ideas together saying that if 
you need a “gallon of gravity” for pulling 
down a 500lb car, then a second 500lb does 
not change the rate of falling because the 
added mass comes with additional gravity. 
In this analogy, gravity is mapped onto the 
fuel per car:  
 
Daniel: Yeah, but I guess I'm not 
completely convinced. 
Lynn: (laughing) yeah, I can see I'm not 
explaining it well.  But now…. 
Daniel: I mean it's a good idea, but it's, I 
don't know, the objection is going 
to be. 
Lisa: I thought it was going to be like, you 
were going with the whole 
/formula/ thing (Lynn: Mmm 
hmm.) So… 
Lynn: It is, it's equal on each little section 
of it, No, because you're thinking 
of the (inaudible word).  I'm not 
thinking of the quarter as one 
whole, I'm thinking of the quarter 
as five little separate parts, and 
each one of those little separate 
parts needs the same amount of 
gravity to pull it down.  So that 
you don't gain anything, you don't 
make it any harder. 
Lisa: This equals this? (pointing) It's not 
like it's its own gravity, it's like it 
equals, each part of this equals 
this? It's like the gasoline thing 
sounds different from what you 
were explaining earlier. Because if 
you have 1 gallon for 500 pounds, 
and 2 gallons for a thousand, it's 
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like whatever the formula is, and it 
was good, but it's just like... 
Lynn: Well, with the car, here's a gallon 
of gas, it's like a gallon of gravity. 
That can pull 500 pounds worth of 
car.  But, if I add another 500 
pounds of car, that doesn't mean 
it's all of a sudden going to come 
down faster, what it means it 
needs its share of gravity as well. 
So it's going to be constant, as I 
add weight to it, I'm actually using 
a little bit more gravity... 
 
In this segment, Lynn continues to 
associate gravity with the substance 
predicate amount, suggested by the use of 
attributes such as amount of, little bit more, 
and gallon of gravity. She also uses the 
substance predicate consume via the analogy 
of gravity as consumable fuel (“using a little 
bit more gravity”). 
 
Lynn's final utterance suggests the 
notion of compensation, how the effect of 
adding more mass is compensated by using 
more gravity. (This notion of compensation 
becomes a vehicle through which the group 
later comes to a satisfying explanation.) 
Also, note Lynn’s subtle shift away from her 
earlier stance that gravity is not add-able: 
here she says that when you add another car, 
“I’m actually using a little bit more gravity” 
(emphasis added). Following Lynn’s 
explanation, Daniel tries to make sense of it.  
In doing so, he generates his own analogy 
for gravity.  He analogizes gravity to student 
letter-grades; just as Lynn argued that each 
bit of mass comes with its own pull, Daniel 
says that each student comes with her own 
grade, so that adding a student does not raise 
or lower the grade that each gets. For 
instance, putting together three students, 
each with a grade of C, does not change 
their collective grade.  He uses this to makes 
sense of Lynn’s idea of how gravity could 
remain constant even as you add weight to 
an object: 
  
Daniel: No, well you are /stipulating/ but 
I guess I'm just trying to think of 
what the objections will be.... I 
was trying to think of an analogy, 
and I haven't come up with a very 
good one, I don't think, you could 
think of it in terms of grading 
students on an absolute scale, so 
that, let's say I have two students, 
and they both can get the same 
grade, they get A's, they both can 
get A's.  It's not like I only have a 
certain amount of A, so I have to 
divide that, so they both get C's, 
because there's not enough A-ness 
in order to give them both A's.  
So, if gravity, if that's a useful 
analogy, regardless of the /mass/ 
they still get A's. 
Lynn: No, because I'm not saying there's 
a finite amount of gravity that has 
to be divided between everything, 
that's kind of what you're saying, 
that there's a certain amount of 
points.  I'm thinking of gravity as 
something that's spread equally on 
the earth, and - 
Daniel: Right, no, no, but I'm saying it 
doesn't work that way, that you 
don't give them both C's, you 
can't give them all C's, because 2 
C's don't equal an A, I'm saying 
they can all have A's, in the same 
way that gravity is absolutely 
constant, what changes is mass, 
just like…what would change [in 
my story] 
Lynn: Umm... I guess kind of what, now 
how I'm trying to think of it, now 
if we have something heavier 
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going faster, then if we stacked up 
all those students together and a 
lot them only had C's, now all of a 
sudden they would all have an A, 
but truly, whether we pack them 
all together or drop them 
separately, they're C's, and when 
we drop something (inaudible) all 
we've essentially done is packed 
them all together, but a nickel's 
worth of weight, (inaudible) and if 
there are a hundred nickels of 
weight in something, it's still going 
to be the same gravity, cause 
they're each working on that little 
piece, like the nickel,  like an 
economy of scale [] you still need 
the same amount for each little bit 
of mass, but on the other hand, 
you're not penalized for being 
heavier, because… 
Daniel: Alright, if you have a roll of 
quarters and you drop it and film 
it and time how long it took, and 
then you have all these quarters 
strung out apart from each other,  
Lynn: They come down the same 
Daniel: Right.  That's not an explanation, 
but it shows your principle. 
 
In Daniel’s metaphor of gravity as 
letter-grade, gravity is reconceived as an 
intensive property of an object that is not 
shared or enhanced by adding more objects 
or dividing an object into parts.  By 
changing the metaphor, Daniel is able to 
reconcile attributing spatial location and 
quantification to gravity without needing to 
conserve it. 
 
 Daniel ends this conversation by 
suggesting an experiment that would make 
Lynn’s reasoning very explicit: how the roll 
of quarters (heavy object, consolidated) 
would fall compared to having the quarters 
strung out (heavy object, separated into 
parts).  Lynn and Daniel agree that they will 
come down the same.  
 
Summary and Discussion for 
Episode 1: Overall, Daniel’s and Lynn’s 
language in this first episode suggests the 
coordination of multiple substance-based 
ontologies of gravity, e.g., as stuff that 
comes in finite, quantifiable amounts within 
falling objects, or as an agentive substance 
that can “pull” or “work on” falling objects.  
Daniel objects to Lynn’s reasoning 
on ontological grounds, challenging her 
reluctance to conceptualize the amount of 
gravity as add-able or divisible. His 
objections highlight subtle differences in the 
way they are thinking about gravity.  Daniel 
is thinking of gravity as quantifiable and 
add-able (i.e., conserved).  Lynn, on the 
other hand, also quantifies gravity, but 
mostly rejects the idea of gravity as add-
able, perhaps because she leans more 
heavily on the force as agent metaphor.  
Daniel’s final analogy, which seems to 
connect with Lynn’s ideas, compares gravity 
to a letter-grade.  The final reconciled 
analogy taken up by both Lynn and Daniel 
conceptualizes gravity as an intensive 
property of an object ̶ a property that is 
not enhanced or diluted by adding more 
objects or dividing an object into parts. 
Overall, their argument is reminiscent of 
what Brookes and Etkina call “ontological 
disambiguation”; Daniel and Lynn are trying 
to figure out what kind of entity gravity is 
by arguing about what attributes apply in 
this situation. 
From the perspective of evaluating 
correctness, all the metaphors and analogies 
employed by Daniel and Lynn are 
ontologically incorrect, in that they are 
substance-based and/or they fail to 
disambiguate forces from fields  [65]. So, as 
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mentioned above, the instructors faced a 
tension between supporting the reflective 
argumentation between Lynn and Daniel as 
they struggle to make sense of a physical 
phenomenon and nudging Lynn and Daniel 
toward correct ontologies. Ultimately, as 
shown in the next episode, Daniel and 
another teacher from a different small group 
are able to build on the explanation 
developed by Lynn and Daniel to make 
significant progress toward reaching a 
correct explanation for the phenomenon. 
V. EPISODE 2: THE WHOLE GROUP 
BUILDS ON LYNN’S PRESENTED 
IDEA 
As usual in this workshop, the small-
group discussion just analyzed was followed 
by a whole-group discussion for the purpose 
of sharing ideas between groups. In this 
section, we discuss how ideas presented by 
Lynn’s small group were taken up by the 
larger group and to show how teachers come 
to construct the correct physics explanation 
for why objects of different masses fall with 
the same acceleration. The discussion, at 
times, focuses on the explanation from 
Lynn’s and Daniel’s group. When the 
discussion goes in other directions, we 
summarize the discussion here rather than 
presenting it in detail. 
Andy opens the discussion with a bid 
for groups to contribute their thoughts: 
 
Andy: The last thing we did was try to 
resolve in our little groups why it 
wasn't the case that gravity would 
grab the heavier bottle and pull it 
down more quickly than the other 
bottles? And I want to hear what 
thoughts you have on that.   
(Lynn raises her hand)  
Andy: Lynn? 
Lynn: Well we came to the 
counterintuitive conclusion that 
gravity works on all things 
equally, regardless of their weight, 
and then we recalled that famous 
experiment where they dropped 
things and they arrived at the 
same time, or when Dave was 
telling us about dropping two 
items in a vacuum, that when it's 
just gravity you're dealing with, 
it's the same. 
Andy: Then it doesn't care, as it were... 
Lynn: Then it doesn't care what it weighs. 
Andy: Okay. So that's a conclusion.  Do 
you have a causal story for why 
that's so? 
Lynn: No, I don't.  I have all that 
evidence, but truly it's 
counterintuitive to me.  I keep 
thinking that something that's 
heavier should fall faster. I don't 
understand the whole… 
 
Lynn reiterates her sense, also stated 
at the start of the small-group discussion, 
that the correct answer is “counterintuitive,” 
indicating that this counter-intuitiveness had 
not been fully resolved for her.  Also note 
that Andy’s utterance, “gravity would grab 
the heavier bottle,” as well as Lynn’s 
utterance, “gravity works on all things” 
suggest the metaphor of gravity as an agent. 
The strong anthropic sense in Andy’s 
wording of the metaphor is striking. Andy 
was aware that the participants had been 
using such language in their small group 
discussions (as in Episode 1). As a 
facilitator, Andy’s goal was to keep the 
conversation focused on meaning making in 
the teachers’ own terms, and this included 
talking in terms that make everyday sense, 
even at the cost of technical precision or 
ontological correctness.  
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The class discussion at this point 
turns to other groups’ ideas.  Another 
teacher, Sam brings up the idea that the 
trajectory of the objects would depend on 
many factors such as its initial momentum, 
the weight, the shape of the object, and the 
height from which it is dropped. For about 
20 minutes the whole group talks about how 
these different factors might play a role in 
determining the time of fall for an object. 
Andy lets the discussion take its course, 
occasionally asking participants to explain 
their causal story for how some condition or 
property makes an object fall faster or 
slower than another.  After about 20 
minutes, Andy makes a bid to bring the 
group back to the question of a heavier 
versus a lighter object: 
 
Andy: So, there is an issue here, even if 
we know the answer, there's still 
the intuition that it's getting pulled 
down harder. So any ideas for 
reconciling that? 
Marissa: I think it falls at the same rate of 
speed, no matter how much it 
weighs. 
Andy: So everything falls at the same rate 
of speed, no matter how much it 
weighs. Right, so that's, um, and 
then some people have been 
saying that once you get to a 
certain height and or speed, you 
start to get away from that, but at 
least for the simple situation we're 
doing here, so that, that, does that 
explain why it happens? ... It very 
nicely clarifies what needs to be 
explained though, so that's 
important.  What needs to be 
explained is, why do these fall at 
the same rate, even though one 
feels to me like it's getting pulled 
down harder? 
 
At this point, Lynn rejoins the 
conversation, articulating some of the ideas 
and analogies that had come up in their 
small group discussion (Episode 1): 
 
Lynn: Well we were really struggling with 
the germ of an idea, and we're not 
totally sure, but, we sort of have 
the idea that, like if you take a roll 
of quarters and one quarter, we 
know that if you drop them, 
they're going to land at the same 
time now.  And to try to reconcile 
that, I was trying, we had a couple 
of analogies, I was trying to think 
of gravity as a constant force all 
over the earth, and in order to pull 
that one quarter down, it takes like 
two ounces, or two whatever, 
units of gravity to pull it down.  
So, when you just lump them all 
together, it doesn't change the fact 
that each one of those quarters in 
that roll is still going to need its 
little two whatevers of gravity, so 
putting them together doesn't 
make it any harder or any easier 
for it to come down, if each little 
part still needs that little bit of 
gravity, so if you thought about 
that coin roll, and slowly started 
separating them, just the fact that 
you're pushing them together 
doesn't, shouldn't really affect the 
fact that each need their own little 
bit of gravity, and we thought 
about a car as well, We said 
maybe it takes fifty gallons to 
move one of those semi trucks a 
mile.  Well, when you add 
another semi truck to it, it doesn't 
make it take less energy, for the 
new space that's been added on, it 
needs more gasoline, so we kind 
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of think of gravity as this is 
something that each little amount 
of space needs a certain amount 
of to be pulled down, and it 
doesn't matter if you lump the 
space together, you pull them 
apart, it's all going to work the 
same, if you think of that roll of 
quarters as just a mess of little 
quarters put together,  
 
Here Lynn analogizes gravity to a 
constant force distributed over the earth; but 
the sense of constancy she expresses is not 
of an absolute constancy, but constant for 
“each little part.”  Her analogy of gravity to 
fuel makes this clearer.  She says that if one 
truck needs 50 gallons to move a mile, then 
two trucks should take twice as much to 
move a mile; one cannot add another truck 
and expect the same 50 gallons to move both 
trucks by a mile.  In that sense, she is 
thinking of the fuel being constant per truck 
and making sense of how gravity could be 
constant “for each little amount of space.”  In 
her quantification of gravity as “2 
whatevers,” in phrases such as “little bit of 
gravity,” and her analogy of gravity as fuel, 
Lynn is ontologically treating gravity as a 
material substance.  And she is doing so 
productively, as it is beginning to help her 
make progress in understanding why heavier 
things do not fall faster. 
Next, Andy teases apart the various 
details to Lynn’s argument in order to really 
understand it and to make sure that the class 
has a sense of Lynn’s explanation of gravity: 
 
Andy: They just happen to be together 
Lynn: They happen to be stuck together, 
but they're still going to be pulled 
down at the same rate. 
Andy: Let me see if I can understand that 
argument.  So you're saying, we'll 
start with the quarters, and then 
we'll talk about the car. 
Lynn: Okay 
Andy: So you're saying, here's a quarter 
(drawing on board), and it /felt/ 
some little bit of gravity to pull it 
down, 2 ounces of gravity 
Lynn: I don't know what gravity's 
measured in (chuckling) 
Andy: 2 ounces of gravity pulls down the 
one quarter...If it's a bunch of 
quarters, well, each one needs its 
own 2 ounces, and they all have 
the gravity downward pull, and 
then the next step is, okay, instead 
of there actually being air between 
the quarters, they're pressed 
together into a roll.  And you're 
saying that's a difference that is 
not really a difference.  The point 
is, it's still that number of quarters 
with gravity pulling on each one 
however hard it pulls it, and if 
there's, what, 8 quarters instead of 
1, you've got 8 2-ounce pulls 
instead of 1 2-ounce pull. 
 
Here, as earlier, Andy responds 
using the same kind of language that the 
teacher-participants are using, reflecting the 
same matter and agency attributes in phrases 
such as “2 ounces of gravity” and “gravity 
pulling on each.” Such revoicing, we feel, 
helped maintain the framing of the 
discussion as an activity to make sense of 
one’s own ideas. 
Another teacher, Nancy, raised the 
argument that lumping the quarters together 
versus having air between them would affect 
how they fall due to the added air resistance 
in the latter case.  Andy responded to that 
argument by saying that air resistance would 
indeed play a role if we were thinking about 
dropping feathers lumped together or 
separated out, but not for pennies since they 
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are so light and compact. Sam brought up 
the idea of how conveyor belts on airports 
move at a constant speed irrespective of the 
weight they carry.  But when probed, he did 
not offer a mechanism for how that happens, 
just that gravity could be like a conveyor 
belt that maintains the objects at a constant 
speed.  After this, Andy brings the 
discussion back to Lynn’s argument: 
 
Andy: In this story, gravity is adjustable in 
that the single quarter feels one 
unit of pull, the 8 pack of quarters 
feels 8 units of pull, so by this 
story, it's like, it would be like the 
walkway knowing to start working 
harder somehow, and the way 
gravity knows is that it just pulls 
each quarter separately. 
 
Note that this is exactly the point that 
Daniel was contending in the small group 
discussion.  Daniel wanted the addition and 
subtraction of gravity with added or 
removed mass as an allowable move, while 
Lynn at that time was rejecting this idea 
since she was focusing on the idea of 
sameness of gravity per unit object.  Here 
Lynn does not object to Andy’s move of 
adding the gravity for the eight quarters ‒ 
perhaps due to Andy’s status as an instructor 
for the workshop.  Another speculation is 
that Lynn has warmed up to the notion of 
gravity increasing proportionally as you add 
objects. Andy’s articulation of which object 
feels what amount of pull (“if there's, what, 
8 quarters instead of 1, you've got 8 2-ounce 
pulls instead of 1 2-ounce pull,  might also 
have lent clarity to what is being added; as 
discussed earlier, the ambiguous use of 
pronouns might have contributed to Daniel’s 
and Lynn’s disagreement about the add-
ability of gravity. 
 Now Daniel ‒ who earlier has been 
arguing for being able to add gravity when 
joining together multiple lumps of mass‒ 
takes on Andy’s idea of lumping the quarters 
asking if the inertia of the quarters would 
also be proportional to the number of 
quarters:  
 
Daniel: Well, the 8 quarters also have 8 
times the inertia, right?  So it's 
going to, if they're heavier, they're 
going to have more mass, so they 
have more inertia, um, does that 
factor in? 
Andy: So, more inertia.  So what is inertia 
meaning for us, you right now? 
Daniel: Um, it's going to have, uh, when 
you drop it, it wants to stay at rest, 
but gravity's pulling it down, so 
it's got to overcome that 
willingness to stay at rest.  The 
more massive it is, the more it's 
going to want to stay, to not move. 
Andy: So you're saying things that are 
just sitting somewhere don't want 
to move, and you're saying the, 
uh, the bigger heavier thing has 
more "not want to moviness" to it 
then a lighter thing, so. 
Daniel: 8 quarters stacked together is 8 
more times not willing to move 
than one quarter. 
Andy: So the 8 quarters is 8 times as hard 
to move. 
Dave: But that means there's 8 times as 
much gravity pulling it down. 
Daniel: Right. And that’s why they fall at 
the same /time/. 
Andy: But there's 8 times as much gravity 
pulling it down.  (overlapping with 
Daniel’s utterance) 
 
Daniel brings an idea into the 
discussion, inertia, that he clarifies as 
“willingness to stay at rest” and that the 8 
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quarters put together will be 8 times more 
difficult to move.  Dave reiterates the idea 
that the 8 quarters also have 8 times the pull 
on a single quarter.  This idea later forms the 
bridge to arriving at the canonically correct 
explanation.   
A few aspects of Daniel’s reasoning 
are worth noting.  First, his description of 
inertia in colloquial language is powerful in 
conveying the abstract idea of inertia. It also 
suggests that Daniel is taking an 
epistemological stance in which he expects 
that abstract science concepts such as inertia 
can connect to everyday thinking, a stance 
that the workshop specifically targeted. 
Further, Dave’s and Daniel’s language of 
“gravity pulling it down” continues to reflect 
the sense of gravity as an agent that has 
been present in the discussion from the start. 
At this point in the discussion several 
people start speaking. Andy ties together the 
two ideas of gravitational force and inertia 
increasing proportionally with increased 
mass.  
 
Andy: So in this story now, there's, uh, 
we keep getting these battles, 
maybe it's just my male GI Joe 
thing.  There's this battle, on the 
one hand, gravity wants to move 
the thing when you drop it, on the 
other hand, something doesn't 
want to get moved.  If there 
weren't gravity and I let go of this 
thing, what would it do. 
 
Several voices: (inaudible) 
 
Andy: Yeah, it doesn't want to move, 
This garbage can's not going to 
move unless something kicks it.  
Um, so by this story, there's this 
battle between the pull of gravity 
and the tendency of the thing not 
to want to move.  And for a single 
quarter, there's a certain amount 
of “not wanting to moviness” and 
a certain amount of pull, and the 
result of that battle leads to 
whatever fall you see. For 8 
quarters, how much more “not 
wanting to moviness” does it 
have? 
Voices: 8 times 
Andy: It's 8 times as reluctant to move, 
but... 
Voices: 8 times the... 
Andy: It's got 8 times as much pull on it. 
Erwin: That makes sense. 
Andy: With the anvil, it's huge, it's 500 
times more reluctant to move, but 
it's got 500 times more pull on it, 
so it cancels each other out. 
 
In this final segment, Andy tried to 
tie together the ideas brought by Daniel and 
Dave, that the higher gravitational pull on an 
object of larger mass is exactly compensated 
by its higher inertia, so that objects of 
different masses have the same acceleration 
due to gravity.  The leading nature of his 
facilitation at this point, however, makes it 
difficult to gauge how well the teacher 
participants are “getting it.” 
In the next section we continue our 
discussion of how the material substance 
ontology of gravity was productive for the 
group in making progress toward this correct 
explanation. 
VI. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS 
We presented a case study of in-service 
middle- and elementary-school teachers, in a 
professional development setting, trying to 
figure out a causal explanation for why 
dropped objects of different masses fall 
equal distance in equal time. Four teachers 
discussing this within their small group 
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acknowledge that they know the phenome-
non through standard physics demonstra-
tions but are puzzled about an explanation, 
since it feels as if the more massive object is 
pulled down harder. We analyzed this dis-
cussion because our attention was drawn to 
the teachers’ ontologically-rich analogies 
and reasoning.  Upon closer analysis, we 
found that most of the utterances encoded an 
ontology of gravity as an agent and gravity 
as a material substance – ideas which have 
often been marked by science education re-
searchers as “mis-ontologies” that represent 
misconceptions and hinder conceptual de-
velopment. We argue that these “mis-
ontologies” were productive in leading 
teachers to construct a correct explanation 
for the phenomenon.  
The idea that gravity acts on each 
part of an object as if that part were not at-
tached to the rest of the object, and hence 
the (heavy) object falls in the same way as 
its (lighter) pieces would fall, was used by 
Galileo  [66]. For the teachers, this reason-
ing flowed directly from their thinking of 
different pieces (quarters, cars, parts of a 
tootsie roll) having a certain amount of grav-
ity pulling them down (coordinating two on-
tological resources: gravity as substance 
contained by falling objects and gravity as a 
material agent acting on falling objects).  In 
other words, the Galilean reasoning emerged 
because of, not in spite of, the teachers’ 
“mis-ontologies” of gravity.  And this idea 
of each coin in a roll of coins feeling a cer-
tain amount of gravity then fed into the 
Newtonian compensation argument whereby 
the heavier object feels more gravitational 
pull but also puts up more resistance to get-
ting moved. So, in the discussion, the mis-
ontologies of gravity propagated all the way 
to this Newtonian argument — and later in 
the session, a discussion of Newton’s second 
law.  To be clear, we do not dispute that the 
teachers would need to think about forces 
and gravity in some ontologically different 
ways in order to achieve an expert under-
standing of those concepts and of Newtonian 
mechanics more generally. Our point is 
simply that the teachers made striking con-
ceptual progress reasoning in terms of “in-
correct” ontologies of force and gravity. 
More importantly, this episode sug-
gests that in some cases, attempts to stamp 
out novices’ substance-based ontologies 
might be counter-productive for their learn-
ing because such interventions would dis-
rupt participants’ sense-making about the 
physical phenomenon—their construction of 
causal, coherent explanations consistent 
with the evidence. Having the space to value 
and make sense of their own ideas helped 
Lynn and Daniel add greater clarity to their 
arguments. An early intervention by the fa-
cilitator stating the “correct” language to use 
could have directed attention away from 
their own arguments and towards using the 
“right” words.  
 
A. Addressing counterarguments 
We want to start by addressing coun-
ter-arguments that could be posed by re-
searchers who have argued that substance-
based ontologies for non-material entities 
lead to robust misconceptions  [17–
20,23,28,31–40,61] and hence that instruc-
tors should nudge learners away from these 
mis-ontologies. One such argument is that 
the teachers in our group, despite engaging 
in extensive discussion, did not change their 
ontological view of gravity. Indeed, the mis-
ontology might have been reinforced by the 
lack of attention drawn to it by the facilitator 
who, at times, co-opted the language encod-
ing the incorrect ontology. By this argument, 
the current episode shows how, without ap-
propriate intervention, ontological miscon-
ceptions do not simply get corrected via dis-
cussion. 
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On this point, we agree: the teachers 
did not undergo any wholesale ontological 
change within this episode.  
The data, however, challenge the in-
structional implication that incorrect onto-
logical classification of science concepts is 
categorically unproductive and should be 
stamped out as soon as possible  [21].  More 
importantly, this episode suggests that in 
some cases, attempts to stamp out novices’ 
substance-based ontologies might be coun-
ter-productive for learning because such in-
terventions would disrupt participants’ 
sense-making about the physical phenome-
non—their construction of causal, coherent 
explanations consistent with the evidence. 
Another counterargument is that this 
episode is too unusual to inform the debate 
about how to address students’ naïve ontol-
ogies, since in most usual cases, learners us-
ing incorrect ontologies will not make such 
conceptual progress. By this argument, our 
data may show that it’s possible for mis-
ontologies to support productive reasoning 
but not that it’s common. We have two re-
sponses to this.  First, while acknowledging 
that this episode was unusual in how quickly 
and articulately the small group came to a 
“cool” (in this case, Galilean) explanation, 
we note that in our summer workshops, 
teachers commonly relied on “incorrect” on-
tologies to make conceptual progress. The 
very next summer, for instance, another 
teacher (supported by a facilitator) came up 
with a gravity-inertia “compensation” ex-
planation for why heavy and light objects 
fall together, without changing her agent-
like ontology of gravity. And in multiple 
summers, teachers have conceptualized elec-
tric current as “stuff” to support productive 
reasoning about what happens to the current 
at a junction in a circuit. (In Chi et al’s 
framework, it is incorrect to think of current 
in substance-like ways.)  So, again, the epi-
sodes presented in this paper are unusually 
dramatic but not unusual in challenging the 
view that mis-ontologies necessarily block 
conceptual progress.  Second, we note that 
even in most reform-oriented physics cur-
ricula, due to time constraints, students are 
guided to make fairly “direct” conceptual 
progress toward expert conceptions and on-
tologies. In those contexts, allowing mis-
ontologies to persist for even a short time 
could be inefficient for the vast majority of 
students, and hence studies conducted in 
those contexts are likely to show that mis-
ontologies are a hindrance to learning. In our 
summer workshops, by contrast, we are not 
trying to reach pre-determined conceptual 
goals within a fixed time and hence the 
teachers can take more “indirect” paths to-
ward improved conceptual understandings. 
This learning environment allows us to see 
the potential productivity of reasoning 
grounded in “incorrect” ontologies more 
clearly than is evident in more guided, time-
constrained environments.  Our point is that 
when mis-ontologies act as a barrier to 
learning, the barrier arises not from a fun-
damental cognitive limitation on building 
conceptual progress out of “incorrect” on-
tologies, but rather, from the incompatibility 
of those mis-ontologies with the particular 
conceptual pathways along which PER-
based curricula guide students. 
B. Instructional implications and educa-
tional values 
We started the paper by summarizing a de-
bate on novice cognition, and we want to 
end with a note on educational values. In her 
book, The Having of Wonderful Ideas, 
Duckworth decries the notion that “there is 
one best way to understand”  [67] (p. xii): 
 
The essays in this book start in-
stead from the premise mentioned 
above – that there is a vast array of 
very different adequate ways that 
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people come to their understand-
ing. 
Curriculum, assessment, 
teacher education programs – and 
all of our teaching – must seek 
out, acknowledge, and take ad-
vantage of the diversity of ways 
that people might take toward un-
derstanding. We cannot plan “the 
logical sequence” through a set of 
ideas, especially if we want 
schools to make sense for students 
whose backgrounds differ from 
out own….we must find ways to 
present subject matter that will 
enable learners to get at their own 
thoughts about it. Then we must 
take those thoughts seriously, and 
set about helping students to pur-
sue them in greater breadth and 
depth.” ( [67] p. xiii) [emphasis 
and paragraph break as in origi-
nal] 
 
In step with Eleanor Duckworth, we feel that 
classrooms – and professional development 
spaces – should be a place for the “having of 
wonderful ideas,” that learners should feel 
that the classroom is a place where they are 
free to explore and play with ideas, make 
mistakes, and reflect on their progress, ra-
ther than a place that undervalues their expe-
riences and ideas and defines the purpose of 
learning as faithfully absorbing the ideas 
generated by others (scientists, in science 
classrooms) in a prescribed manner. A sci-
ence learning environment should be a place 
for discovery rather than a place only for 
learning of the end products of other peo-
ple’s discovery. To be clear, we are not say-
ing that there is no place for learning 
knowledge produced by communities of sci-
entists and mathematicians. But increased 
emphasis on “getting” the correct concep-
tions (and correct ontologies for those con-
cepts) and recommendations to strongly 
guard against any incorrectness (in terms of 
conceptual knowledge, terminology, ontolo-
gy) are a threat to the classroom as a place 
for pursuing the authentic practices of sci-
ence. And we feel that with respect to this 
need the professional development space for 
teachers should also provide teachers expe-
riences with the authentic pursuit of science 
as an exploration into natural phenomenon, 
and creating causal, coherent explanations 
for such phenomenon  [68,69]. How can we 
expect teachers who have not undergone 
such experiences themselves to create such 
experiences for their students?  
The experience of struggling with 
trying to explain how objects of different 
masses fall with the same acceleration was a 
powerful experience for Lynn – one that she 
refers back to many times over the course of 
4 years in our professional development 
program. She always remembers it fondly 
and with excitement as helping her experi-
ence the excitement of doing science. In an 
interview during the fourth year into the pro-
ject (with a team member who joined in year 
2 and wasn’t deeply involved in the profes-
sional development part of the project), 
Lynn says:  
 
On a personal level, the first year I 
did this and we did the, one of the 
things where you drop book and 
feather, which hits first? And we 
had to figure out for ourselves 
how that occurs? What happens? 
And I, it was very frustrating work-
ing through that, but when I actu-
ally figured it out for myself, that 
was probably one of the most ex-
hilarating intellectual moments 
I've ever had in my life. It was just 
really astonishing. And then, that 
was cool because that happened 
with me that summer, and then I 
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started using it in classroom, and I 
can see same kind of epiphany 
occurring with students, and I 
know how exhilarating and em-
powering it is to have that kind of 
experience. So that's probably 
been the most amazing part. 
 
Lynn added that the “non-
judgmental” atmosphere made her and oth-
ers feel “they have something really signifi-
cant to contribute.  And that’s been… amaz-
ing… for me, just in life in general.”  
An early focus on correcting Lynn’s 
ontology and driving her to think about 
gravity as a force, and hence as an interac-
tion – not as a material agent/substance – 
would most likely have robbed Lynn of this 
transformational experience. And in our vi-
sion of professional development programs 
for science teachers, we value such experi-
ences more than creating conceptual change. 
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